Newspaper Comments *

Inipol EAP22, Corexit 9527 *, Simple Green. References The active ingredient for these products is 2-butoxyethanol,* an industrial solvent for grease and oil, that is a chronic and severe acute health hazard, according to the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1977). "Butyl cellosolve" or 2-butoxyethanol causes eye, ear, throat, and respiratory tract irritation; coughing; runny nose; central nervous system effects such as headache, dizziness, and nausea; blood disorders such as *hemolytic anemia; and kidney damage (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 1998). * hemolytic anemia in this case would be premature destruction of red blood cells caused by chemical poisoning.

Alaska Health Project's 1989 flyer on glycol ethers and 2-butoxyethanol and noted: "The exposure limits set by OSHA may not relate to current health data on chemical products. The current PEL for butyl cellosolve is 50 ppm (skin). An independent group, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists recommends a threshold limit value of 25 ppm. NIOSH is considering an exposure limit well below this TLV." The NIOSH recommended exposure limit (REL) 2-butoxyethanol is 5 ppm. NIOSH recommends a program of personal monitoring if exposure levels are at or above half the REL. If exposure is greater than the 5 ppm REL or if there is potential for skin contact, NIOSH recommends that 2-butoxyacetic acid be measured in the worker's urine (ATSDR 1998, p. 327).

While there is a large body of literature on human health effects of exposure to 2-butoxyethanol accessible through EPA's catalogue library of medical HSDB/Toxnet search, two studies are relevant to the EVOS cleanup. One study of 12 exposure experiments with 5 men investigated percutaneous absorption of this glycol ether and concluded that "persons exposing large portions of their skin to butoxyethanol are at risk of absorbing acutely toxic doses"(Johanson et al. 1988). In the second, the influence of water on percutaneous absorption of 2-butoxyethanol was observed in guinea pigs (Johanson and Fernstrom 1988) The results of this study concluded that "water facilitates the percutaneous absorption of butoxyethanol." This may have important implications for better understanding human exposure in marine oil spill situations where cleanup workers have extended exposure to solvents and water.

The MSDS for each of these products reflect, to varying degrees, the potential health effects listed for 2-butoxyethanol. The MSDS for Inipol EAP22, an Exxon product in partnership (correction) with the French company Elf Aquitaine, lists primary routes of occupational exposure as skin contact and inhalation (Exxon 1989). If absorbed through the skin, Inipol can be moderately toxic and may cause blood and kidney damage. Exxon lists it as slightly toxic if inhaled, and a possible irritant to the skin and eyes. High vapor concentrations may irritate the eyes and respiratory tract and may result in Central Nervous System effects including headaches, dizziness, nausea, drowsiness, leading to unconsciousness and possible death. Also, prolonged or repeated contact may remove natural oils from the skin, dry the skin, and cause irritation, redness and rash. The MSDS warns, "exposures to liquids, vapors, mists, or fumes should be minimized."

The MSDS for the Exxon product Corexit 9527 lists similar potential health effects of exposure including irritation to the eye, skin, and respiratory tract. Low order toxicity may result from skin contact as compound "may be absorbed through skin to produce hemolytic anemia and kidney damage evidenced by paleness and possibly red coloration of the urine." Further, "vapors and/or aerosols, which may be formed at elevated temperatures may cause systemic effects." (Inipol was heated to a target temperature of 90ºF before application.) Chronic effects of overexposure by inhalation or dermal contact may result in damage to the blood and kidneys.

One clinical study, rats *** were treated orally with weathered crude oil and Corexit 9527 to determine impacts on "intestinal microbial metabolism and associated populations" (George et al. 2001). The study found undiluted dispersant was lethal to the rats, and changes in weight were observed relative to the amount of dilution; Corexit 9527 was also toxic in vitro at a dilution of 1:1000 (George et al. 2001). According to the authors, this study suggests that "prolonged exposure of mammals to oil, dispersant, or in combination impacts intestinal metabolism, which ultimately could lead to altered detoxification of oil constituents and coexposed constituents" (George et al. 2001). While this study does not address human health effects, it is clear that this dispersant has not been proven to be a completely benign substance, although the degree of human hazard remains unclear.

It is ironic to note that the MSDS for both Inipol EAP22 and Corexit 9527 warn to "keep product out of sewers and watercourses" or "prevent liquid from entering sewers, watercourses, or low areas," respectively. Exxon used a total of 104,510 gallons (395,500 liters) of Inipol on beaches in Prince William Sound alone during Exxon Valdez Oil Spill cleanup operations from 1989 through 1991 (Bragg et al. 1992 in Mearns 1996). Bioremediation was the most frequently occurring treatment type in all sectors in all years, according to Mearns (Table 1, p. 313). As a precaution, beaches treated with Inipol were flagged with bright red "scary face" balloons, allegedly to protect fish and wildlife. No follow up monitoring was done to determine if this was successful as people were warned to stay away from Inipol-treated beaches for 2 tidal cycles (24 hours).  *

The MSDS for Simple Green (US DOL 1987) states that there are "no signs or symptoms from any possible foreseeable exposures individuals with severe allergies, asthma, hay fever, or skin conditions with open sores" may experience "generally aggravated" symptoms after exposure. Further, "ingesting extremely large doses may result in nausea, vomiting, agitation, insomnia or drowsiness (and) ingestion over an extended period may produce liver damage." One worker's experience with Simple Green - non EVOS

Evidence of Acute Health Effects from Inipol EAP22.

The first week of August Bioremediation Application Technician Don Moeller (Valdez, AK) logged a textbook case of chemical poisoning from dermal exposure to Inipol. Moeller noted in his journal, (which was subsequently copied and distributed), on 1 August 1989: "(spray) packs are leaking and breaking down a lot. Seems that the pump or pump gasket is breaking down only." A little later that day, he noted: "my rain gear fell apart, so was removed. I worked about two hours around chemical in only a TyVec suit and legs were exposed." He noted a "burning and funny taste left in mouth while using steamer to clean up spilled chemical. Spilled chemical that was cleaned up was placed in Rubber Maid garbage cans that broke apart when trying to move them." On 2 August: "more packs have broken down." On 3 August: "sprayers that have motors are doing great. Guys are doing well, but two have said their throats are sore." On 4 August: "failed UA (urinary analysis) again. Medic is pulling me from beach." Later that day at a meeting: "Exxon's Richard Becker said again the same (thing) that John Messinger told us about the chemical-no hazard to us. Just wear the right gear" (Moeller 1989).

Ten days later on August 14, a beach crew in Seldovia was examined by local doctors when 4 of the 21 workers reported headaches, skin rashes, blisters, and nausea after exposure to an Inipol-treated beach (Spence 8/24/89). Blood work for at least 1 of the 8 workers tested revealed butoxyethanol, an active ingredient in Inipol, in his bloodstream. At a town meeting on the incident, Exxon's doctor downplayed the health risks, stating that butoxyethanol "is in a lot of compounds on the shelves" and sold as cleaning agents (Spence 8/31/89; McDowell 1989). *  However, Seldovia doctor Larry Reynolds warned, "we're within a generation of Agent OrangeŠ There are no good studies to see what things do to you on a long-term basis" (Spence 8/31/89; McDowell 1989). State inspectors with the Department of Labor stated the Seldovia incident was a violation of right-to-know provisions in the Hazard Communication Standard, which was part of state code (Spence 8/31/89).