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Trying to Help
Workers....
Cleanup work was under way in
late April when the Alaska
Department of Labor invited the
government's National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health and
the Laborers International Union to
observe conditions.
The union team, with funding from
the government's National Institute
of Environmental Health Sciences,
criticized the operation and
expressed concerns about workers
inhaling, ingesting or touching
crude oil and inadequate training.
Calling the crude "toxic and
hazardous," the group raised the
possibility that workers were at
risk for skin and other disorders,
including cancer.
The Laborers team proposed that
workers be tracked for chemical
exposure. Led by Eula Bingham,
assistant Labor secretary for
occupational safety and health in
the Carter administration and a
professor at the University of
Cincinnati's College of Medicine,
the team wrote a plan for the study.
Bingham's group visited the Sound
once, but found it difficult to
conduct an independent evaluation.
Getting to the remote worksites
required working through Exxon,
which controlled logistics, and
Exxon wasn't cooperating, she said.
"I must say, we got the
runaround. I am sure (Exxon) didn't
want me around," Bingham said in a
telephone interview. "It has always
troubled me over the years."
The U.S. Public Health Service,
which visited the Sound about the
same time, issued a report that
disagreed with the Laborers and said
toxic exposure threats weren't
nearly as high as the union
suggested.
Generally, the most toxic
elements of crude oil are benzene,
toluene and polynuclear aromatic
hydrocarbons, or PAHs, a group of
over 100 compounds, some of which
can cause cancer. Benzene and
toluene evaporate quickly, and posed
the greatest danger up to 72 hours
after the spill, long before the
massive cleanup got started.
That left the question whether
the remaining PAHs in the
crude oil and the
cleaners and solvents -
like De-Solv-It,
Corexit and
Inipol EAP 22 - presented
any danger to workers, particularly
in combination, and if the yellow
slickers and rubber gloves and boots
the workers used offered enough
protection.
After much debate among
government and Exxon officials, and
at the labor union's urging, the
state Department of Labor determined
the cleanup was a hazardous waste
operation. Bingham's group argued
that OSHA standards required that
workers get 24 to 40 hours of
training.
Carl Reller, an environmental
consultant now living in New Zealand
who was then Veco's manager of
environmental affairs, said in an
interview that he was at the meeting
where state officials asked Exxon
how it would comply. Exxon came back
with a proposal for four hours of
training for each worker, Reller
said. The state accepted that.
"The argument against the 40-hour
standard was that the oil had lost
most of its toxicity in the first
several days following the spill,"
according to the final report
written in 1992 by the Coast Guard's
Federal On Scene Coordinator's
office.
Only a portion of the abbreviated
four-hour course was devoted to
handling crude and chemicals. It
also included bear-country safety
and hypothermia prevention. Three
NIOSH investigators later sat
through the training classes and
deemed them "adequate."
Throughout the summer, NIOSH and
an Exxon contractor conducted tests
to check levels of worker exposure
to toxic substances.
NIOSH officials made three trips
to Alaska that year and took air
samples. They detected benzene in 12
of 33 samples, but the levels were
too low to cause alarm, according to
the agency's report. The agency also
tested for nitrogen dioxide, a
byproduct of diesel fuel combustion,
and found elevated levels. The
agency concluded that some workers
probably were exposed to excessive
diesel fumes, which contain toxic
chemicals and carcinogens.
Exxon hired Med-Tox Associates
Inc. of Anaheim, Calif., for its own
sampling. The bulk of their data was
not released to the public, though
some information trickled out four
years later in the lawsuits. Those
court records show the company
conducted 1,600 tests for light
hydrocarbons like benzene, but only
30 for the more longer-lasting PAHs
and another 114 for oil mist.
The coughing
The massive assault against
spilled oil barely had begun when
workers complained of illness. They
had flu-like symptoms: coughing,
headaches, dizziness and runny
noses.
"At night, in the bunks, it was
like a TB ward," said Carey, who had
only been on the job a couple days
when she started having headaches
and coughs. "Everyone was coughing."
"My lungs were really irritated,"
she said. "Then towards the end of
it, I had like a joint pain in my
hip." Within two weeks, Carey was
airlifted out, her work stint over.
Exxon's chief of medicine that
summer, Dr. Kenneth Gould, said in a
speech that fall to oil industry
officials that the illnesses didn't
respond to antibiotics. "No single
set of antibiotics seemed
efficacious," he said.
State and federal health
officials heard about the sickness
and discussed looking into it. In
its final report in 1991, NIOSH
officials wrote that state health
workers planned to look closer but
they had the same problems as other
health experts: They
couldn't
get Exxon to release
its clinical data, and Exxon
controlled access to workers at
remote locations.
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