THE EXXON-VALDEZ OIL SPILL4
Background
In an attempt to reduce U.S.
oil imports, a consortium of oil companies
announced plans in 1969 to construct a pipeline
from Alaska's North Slope to Valdez, an ice-free
port on the southeastern coast of Alaska.
Federal approval for the 800-mile Trans Alaska
Pipeline System (TAPS) was obtained in 1973, and
the first oil tanker shipment originated from
Valdez on August 1, 1977. It has been estimated
that 75 tankers visit Valdez every month.
Currently, crude oil from Alaska's North Slope
accounts for roughly 25% of total U.S. oil
production. During the past 18 years
approximately ten billion barrels (in excess of
400 billion gallons) of North Slope crude have
been transported by TAPS to the Port of Valdez.
The Spill
Shortly after midnight on
Friday, March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez, a
three-year-old 987-foot tanker carrying 1.25
million barrels (50 million gallons) of North
Slope crude, ran aground on Bligh Reef in
Alaska's Prince William Sound. The Exxon Valdez
left the Port of Valdez at 9:21 pm on March 23,
1989. After navigating the tanker through Valdez
Narrows into Prince William Sound (PWS), the
harbor pilot had transferred command back to
Captain Hazelwood at approximately 11:30 pm. Due
to floating ice from the Columbia Glacer,
Hazelwood had received permission from the Coast
Guard to divert from the Southbound (western)
lane of the Traffic Separation Scheme to the
Northbound (eastern) lane. Rather than opting to
reduce speed and allow the vessel to navigate
the ice flow, however, Hazelwood chose to enter
the 0.9 mile gap between the edge of the ice and
Bligh Reef at accelerating speed. This course, a
more severe detour outside the Traffic
Separation Scheme, allowed little tolerance for
error. Before retiring to his cabin at 11:53 pm,
Hazelwood turned navigation over to the Third
Mate with a command to make a right turn (to
avoid Bligh Reef) when the ship was abeam the
Busby Island light. At 12:04 am, the Exxon
Valdez shuddered as it grounded on Bligh Reef.
However, the radio distress call to the Coast
Guard was delayed until 12:27 am.5
As a result of the grounding,
eight of the vessel's eleven cargo tanks were
ruptured. The resulting oil spill of 258,000
barrels (10.8 million gallons), or 20% of the
ship's cargo, was the 34th largest in the world
at the time and the largest in U.S. waters.
Successful off-loading of the remaining 1
million barrels of oil was completed on April 4.
While the waters of PWS were relatively calm in
the immediate aftermath of the spill, a severe
storm that commenced the third day after the
spill had the effect of driving the spilled oil
toward the shoreline at the southwestern end of
PWS. The data in Table 4 (see map, Figure 3) on
the chronology of the oil spill illustrate the
effect of the storm on the spread of the oil
spill.
The Aftermath
While the Alyeska Pipeline
Service Company, the consortium of seven major
oil companies that operates TAPS and the Valdez
terminal, was legally charged with the
responsibility of oil spill cleanup,
budget-tightening measures introduced in 1981
had resulted in a partial dismantling of the oil
spill response team. Due to the delay in oil
spill response caused by this curtailment of
personnel, the first Alyeska barge, loaded with
50,000 pounds of boom (floating barrier used for
containment) and skimmers, did not arrive at
Bligh Reef until 2:30 pm, more than 14 hours
after the accident. It has been estimated that
most of the oil released from the Exxon Valdez
into PWS had already escaped from the vessel by
5:30 pm the day of the spill.
Overseeing the cleanup
operation spearheaded by Exxon Co. was the Coast
Guard at the federal level and Alaska's
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC)
at the state level. However, mounting a cleanup
campaign from Houston, TX, caused unfortunate
delays although mobilization of equipment was
initiated as early as 4:00 am Alaska time on
March 24, 1989. Frank Iarossi, a graduate of the
U.S. Coast Guard Academy and president of Exxon
Shipping, arrived in Valdez at 5:37 pm on March
24 to assume control of the cleanup operation
despite the fact that Alyeska was charged with
full responsibility for oil spill cleanup in the
contingency plan.5 This outcome was
consistent with federal law that makes the
polluter responsible for the cleanup unless that
organization has insufficient resources, in
which case the U.S. government (the Coast Guard
in the case of offshore spills) intervenes.6
FIGURE 3 Map of Prince
William Sound (PWS) and the South-central Gulf
of Alaska (GOA). Source: Environ. Sci. Technol.
1991, 25, p 203.
TABLE 4 PATH OF THE EXXON
VALDEZ OIL SPILL
| DAY #
|
DATE
|
OIL FRONT
(MI) |
FARTHEST
REACH |
| 4
|
March 27,
1989 |
40
|
Block Island
(PWS) |
| 7
|
March 30,
1989 |
90
|
Montague
Strait (PWS) |
| 11
|
April 3,
1989 |
140
|
Kenai
Peninsula (GOA) |
| 19
|
April 11,
1989 |
250
|
Northern tip
of Kodiak Island |
| 40
|
May 2, 1989
|
350
|
Southern
range of Kodiak Island
|
| 56
|
May 18, 1989
|
470
|
Alaskan
Peninsula |
Fair Use - Source:
http://wulfenite.fandm.edu/exxon-valdez.htm
#4 Reference: Three Years
After . Exxon Co.: Houston, TX, 1992.